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On Being Imposed Upon By Artful or
Designing Persons - The California
Experience with the Involuntary
Placement of the Aged

GEORGE J. ALEXANDER*

INTRODUCTION
Under
when

California

"by

reason

law,
of

old

a

person

is

age ... [he]

considered
is

unable,

incompetent
unassisted,

properly to manage and take care of himself or his property, and
by reason thereof is likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful
or designing persons."!
As this provision of California law suggests, defenselessness
in old age is often treated as incompetency.

When the victim is

younger, being imposed on by artful and designing persons is likely
to be seen as a reason for taking action against those who have so

•
Dean and Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara Law School;
A.B., 1953; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1959; LL.M., 1964; J.S.D., Yale
Law School, 1969. The author would like to thank his research associate,
Christopher Heard, for his assistance.
1. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1460 (West 1956). For a similar definition of in
competency, see CAL. PROB. CODE § 1751 (West Supp. 1977).
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victimized. With old age, a new response creeps in: holding the
victim incompetent, managing his or her property, and often pro
viding enforced institutionalization.
I have referred to the aged as the least militant minority.:!
Passage of life slows physical functioning. That in turn provides
others an excuse for wresting control of a person's life and dimin
ishes the victim's capacity to resist. Consequently, it is not surpris
ing that old people in our society are often wards of their own
wealth and "patients" in hospitals and nursing homes in which they
see themselves as prisoners. These two problems-wardship and
involuntary hospitalization-are inseparable. Both provisions re
spond to the aged person's infirmity by depriving him or her of the
right to manage property and/or liberty. Surrogate management of
the ward's property may unfairly advantage the beneficiaries of the
ward's wealth.3 This article is principally concerned with the
deprivation of liberty inherent in forced placement. However, this
article will concentrate on California surrogate management stand
ards because they provide a better frame of reference for the
assumptions which underlie various types of involuntary interven
tions, and because they are closer to the open-ended commitment
statutes of many other states.
It is customary to distinguish involuntary hospitalization from
other forms of forced placement, such as placement associated with
homes. While the level of deprivation of rights may vary with the
type of placement, both types of placement have much in common
and will therefore be treated together in this article.

Both involuntary placement and surrogate property manage
ment are products of a paternalistic philosophy akin to the attitude
of elders toward children. In this instance, however, the paternal
ism experienced by elders is a product of their children and society.
If there is no vengeance in the role reversal, there is at least
comparably harsh discipline. The treatment accorded cannot be
justified ethically. Moreover, it raises serious constitutional ques
tions, and may itself be seriously contra-indicated from a medical
perspective.
STANDARDS FOR INVOLUNTARY INTERVENTION
The aged are not unique in being subject to surrogate man
agement of property and involuntary hospitalization. Likewise,
2. Alexander, Foreword: Life, Liberty, and Property Rights for the
Elderly, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 267 (1975).
3. See, e.g., Alexander, Surrogate Management of the Property of the
Aged, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 91 (1969).
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my opposition to surrogate management and involuntary hospitali
zation is not limited to their imposition on the aged. Nonetheless,
older people are among the most pitiful of involuntary patients.
Although there is wide statutory variance, most states provide
procedures for intervention in the lives of the elderly for purposes
of managing their property.4 The statute usually provides a proce
dure for surrogate management which does not depend on old age,
but which makes old age a factor militating toward involuntary
intervention. Standards such as "old age," "senility," "extreme old
age," "physical and mental weakness on account of old age," or
"mental infirmities of old age" are quite common.5
Although surrogate management does not automatically lead
to involuntary placement, there appears to be incredible overlap
between the two. Many states still retain relatively open-ended
involuntary commitment statutes which allow involuntary treat
ment of those who are in need of treatment. In those states, old
age militates toward a finding of that need. Thus, in both commit
ment and surrogate management, aging makes one more amenable
to involuntary process.
To the extent that the criteria for involuntary commitment
and those for declaration of incompetency differ, the standards for
incompetency tend to be more encompassing.
The California
incompetency provisions are chosen for discussion here primarily
for that reason.
Moreover, incompetency is often the first step
toward involuntary hospitalization.
The language of the California Probate Code is typical."
While this commitment statute only provides for involuntary place
ment of persons who are either dangerous or so gravely disabled as
to be unable to provide for their basic needs, the conservatorship
provision reached a broader group-those people who cannot
manage their affairs unassisted.
In addition, the statute vaguely
suggests a relationship between that functional inability and old
age. It also implies that there is a relationship between that
inability and being deceived or imposed upon by artful and design
ing persons. No doubt both qualifications help slightly to limit
4. Id. at 98-1'28.
5. Id. at 130.
6. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
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the statute since most people could be accused of being unable
properly to manage their affairs unassisted.
The former qualification requires no further examination. It
is obviously a product of an assumption that older people are more
likely to need surrogate managers than others. Yet, the second
qualification tends to obscure the fact that the provision may not
protect those who cannot manage their affairs. Rather, it protects
their heirs and keepers from the overreaching of third parties. If
the standard were intended to be solicitous only of the potential
ward, it would end at a finding of the ward's need. Instead, the
standard apparently focuses on the dynamics of the ward's relation
ship with others. In the case of a needy person, money spent on
new friends deprives both the heirs of a wealthy person and the
state of resources. As thus structured, incompetency proceedings
are, in reality, adversary proceedings in which the petitioner may
vindicate his or her personal interest, rather than the interest of the
ward.7 In both incompetency proceedings and involuntary com
mitment proceedings, the law is cast as though only the ward's
benefit were in issue. In actuality, the petitioner frequently has a
great deal at stake. The proceedings are not designed to and do
not in fact examine the petitioner's interest. Consequently, the
proceedings lend themselves to abuse by favoring petitioners to the
disadvantage of the ward.
In California, there has been a recent mood of reform with
respect to intervention, involuntary commitment, and conserva
torship/guardianship. Even before the adoption of the Lanter
man-Petris-Short Act in 1969, section 5571 of the California
Welfare and Institutions Code provided that U[n]o case of harm
less chronic mental unsoundness or mental deficiency shall be
committed to the Department of Mental Hygiene for placement in
any state hospital for the care and treatment of the mentally ill."s
Nonetheless, the Assembly Subcommittee on Mental Health found
that these old people-presumably the ones described in section
5571-represented a disproportionate percentage of state hospital
residents.9
Concerned about that fact and about other abuses in involun
tary commitment, the legislature passed the Lanterman-Petris-

7. See G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, THE AGED AND THE NEED FOR SURRO
GATE MANAGEMENT (1972); Alexander, note 2 supra.
8. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5571 (West 1966) (repealed 1969).
9. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, SUBCOMM. ON
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Short Act in 19 69.01

Prior law allowed persons to be involuntarily

hospitalized because they were in need of supervision, treatment,
care or restraint.

The new bill replaced this language with only

two general provisions for confinement of mentally ill persons for
longer than emergency seventy-two hour incarceration:
to others" and "danger to self".u
defined.12

"danger

Both provisions were restrictively

The new law also added a provision for the hospitaliza

tion of those who are gravely disabled, defining grave disability as
"[a] condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder,
is unable to provide for his basic personal needs for food, clothing
or shelter."13

The rigor of grave disability conservatorships stood

in bold relief to conservatorships established under the California
Probate Code.14
During 1977, probate conservatorships were altered by the Lan
terman bill incorporating much of the philosophy of the Lanter
man-Petris-Short Act into the Probate Code.

A study by the

National Senior Citizens Center had determined that eighty per
cent of persons for whom conservatorship had been ordered were
over sixty-five.

In addition, they found that ninety-three percent

of these people had been conserved without their appearance in
court. Finally, the study noted that ninety-seven percent had been
conserved without legal representation in the proceedings.1o

The

new bill was designed to assure that the elderly would no longer be
the objects of such casual deprivations of their liberty. As the
Lanterman-Fetris-Short Act had done before it, the new Lanter
man bill establishes strong procedural safeguards against improper
ly obtained conservatorships.

Chief among these safeguards is a

MENTAL HEALTH, THE Dn.EMMA OF MENTAL COMMITMENTS IN CALIFORNIA, A
BACKGROUND DOCUMENT 78 (1976).
10. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5401 (West 1972).
11. Id. § 5250.
12. Id. §§ 5260, 5300.
13. Id. § 5008(h) (amended 1976). See id. § 5008(h) (West Supp. 1977)
for further additions to this statutory provision.
14. Id. §§ 5350-5368 (West 1972).
15. The National Senior Citizens Center is a federally funded legal ser
vices center concerned with the legal problems of the elderly poor. The
study cited above was an empirical study covering the complete Los
Angeles County central district guardianship and conservatorship filings
under CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1460-1470 (West 1956) and CAL. PROB. CODE §§
1701-2207 (West Supp. 1977) from July 1, 1973 to June 30, 1974. Included
in this research was an individual examination of 1,010 case files.
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provision which prohibits, in most circumstances, the granting of
orders of conservatorship or guardianship in the absence of the
ward.16 Another provision requires a court investigator to visit the
proposed ward in those infrequent circumstances where the ward is
certified as unable to attend the hearing.17

Finally, review provi

sions for conservatorships and guardianships are more stringent
than those under prior law, and notice and hearing provisions are
strengthened.1s
As mentioned above, the conservatorship/guardianship provi
sions are related to involuntary commitment of the elderly.10

The

tests themselves, and the arguments surrounding their adoption,
are instructive of involuntary placement issues.

Under the new

bill, the vague standards which allowed the appointment of guardi
ans and conservators to such things as infirmities of old age have
been abolished.

The new law makes clear that the standard is

functional and non-medical.

The precise wording was the result

of a compromise between the State Bar Legal Services representa
tives and representatives of the State Bar Committee on Probate
and Trust.

On the one hand, the Legal Services members insisted

on limiting the standar� for intervention to those aspects of dys
function which directly relate to providing food, clothing and
shelter.

On the other hand, the Probate and Trust people strongly

insisted on retaining much of the prior language, especially the
provisions regarding deception by artful or designing persons.
The "artful and designing persons" test was not
California.20

unique to
Moreover, the test was often difficult to employ.21

This standard is based on a belief that it is important to intervene
in the lives of older people, even though those people may be able
to manage their own lives. One authority has commented that

[t]hese [old] people . . . cannot be judged to be incompetent. They
know what they are doing, they want to do just what they are do
ing, and to live the way they are living. Still, from our present
16. 1976 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv., ch. 1357, § 6, at 94-96 (amending CAL.
PROB. CODE § 1461 (West 1956».
17. Id. § 7, at 96-97 (amending CAL. PROB. CODE § 1461.1 (West 1956».
18. Id. §§ 11-13, at 99-100 (amending CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1470-1472 (West
1956».
19. See text accompanying notes 4-9 supra.
20. Alexander, supra note 3, at 129.
21. The courts have disagreed over the interpretations to be given
the property management standard. It has been held to mean any
thing from rationally, to that of ordinary reasonable care, to a com
parative community standard, to an ability to manage it in a ra
tional manner, to an ability to manage it intelligently, to a disposi
tion of mind which might lead to the wasting away of an estate.
Id. (footnotes omitted).

1088

HeinOnline -- 14 San Diego L. Rev. 1088 1976-1977

[VOL. 14: 1083, 1977]

Involuntary Placement

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

sociological way of thinking they need care, some of them their
estates, most of them their persons.22
Although Probate and Trust representatives insisted that the
"artful and designing persons " language be retained in the new
law, the final bill entirely excluded it from consideration in the
granting of guardianships.

As an alternative ground to the ap

pointment of a conservator, the bill included novel language which
allows such appointment when a person is considered "substantial
ly unable to manage his own financial resources or resist fraud or
undue influence."23

The law limits the application of the new

standard by providing that isolated instances of fraud or undue
influence should not suffice as proof of incapacity.

0

In this respect, the old and new laws differ substantially.

The

old law allowed predictions of future conduct under its susceptible
to infZuence standard.24

functional inability.25

The new law requires proof of present
Prior law did not require even a single

instance of improvidence-only a likelihood of future improvident
behavior.26

The new statute not only requires present improvid

ence but also mandates that improvidence be demonstrated by more
than isolated instances of conduct. Even more significantly, in my
view, the new law requires that the proposed ward be the focus of
functional inability, rather than those who deal with him.
The prior law's concern for old age and artful or designing
persons forced courts to focus on third parties rather than on the
ward.

Since courts neither understand the process of aging nor the

notion of mental debility, the language itself probably provided
strong suggestions as to grounds for declaration of incompetency.
If a judge were in doubt as to whether a person was able properly
to manage, the language of the statute provided that people might
be unable to manage because of diseases, weak mind, or by reason
of old age.
Consider the "artful and designing persons" language.

It encour

aged the judge to focus on persons other than the proposed ward or
22. McAvinchey, The Not-Quite-Incompetent Incompetent, 95 Tn. & EST.
872, 873 (1956).
23. CAL. FROB. CODE § 1751 (West 1956) (amended 1977).
24. Id. §§ 1460, 1751.
25. Id. § 1751 (West Supp. 1977).
26. Id. (West 1956). See aZso In re Cassidy's Guardianship, 95 Cal. App.
641, 273 P. 69 (1928).
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the petitioner. Who? Daddy's young girlfriend? Mother's hair�
dresser? A new religious figure or charity? At the same time,
that language directed the judge's attention from the possible best
interests of the petitioner.
Efforts of near relatives are not the only interests which can be
protected by intervention in the life of an older person. In one
study, it was found that the state of New York was the largest
petitioner for incompetency.27 Similarly, a Los Angeles study
suggests that a large percentage of incompetency proceedings
brought against the aged poor are brought by the state of Califor�
nia.28 Although the state is probably less interested than are the
aged persons' children in preventing the aged from forming new
alliances, the state has an interest in insuring the preservation of
whatever resources exist less it have to expend its own funds.
Moreover, the state may have administrative concerns which can be
managed more effectively if someone has the legal right to make
decisions for the elderly person.29 To the extent that incompeten�
cy proceedings are used by the state to provide an easy mechanism
for paying government services or insuring that assets remain
stable, the state, like other petitioners, promotes its own interest
rather than those of the ward.
In other states which have not adopted the relatively strict
involuntary commitment standards adopted by California, the de�
bate over surrogate management procedure may more closely par�
allel disputes directly concerning involuntary commitment.
A CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED MINIMUM STANDARD?
For a long time, it had apparently been assumed that there were
no serious constitutional questions concerning involuntary place�
ment, presumably because it was conceived to be in the ward's
interest. In O'Connor v. Donaldson,3!J the United States Supreme
Court suggested otherwise. Petitioner in Donaldson successfully
sued for damages resulting from fifteen years of court ordered
incarceration in a mental hospital. He argued that he had not
been dangerous to himself or to others, and that he was capable of
surviving outside of a mental institution. In addition, he alleged
that he had not been treated during his confinement.
27. G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, supra note 7, at 12.
28. See note 15 supra.
29. See, e.g., Wilkie v. O'Connor, 261 App. Div. 373, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617
(1941).
30. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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The Court ultimately held that "[a] State cannot constitutional
ly confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable
of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing
and responsible family members or friends.":n

California's invol

untary commitment law provides that a person may be placed
under a Lanterman-Petris-Short conservatorship if he or she is
gravely disabled.32

The statutory "grave disability"33 criterion

appears to be more stringent than the Supreme Court's test.

How

ever, as applied, the opposite is true. According to Donaldson, it
is significant that a person's survival outside a mental institution
may depend on relatives or friends without impairing his or her

constitutional right to release.34

The "gravely disabled" provisions

of the California statute still await authoritative interpretation by
the courts. However, the provisions have been applied by trial
courts to persons who would clearly have been adequately cared for
by others but were incapable of providing that care without assist
ance. If the Supreme Court's language is to be taken at face value,
such an interpretation by the California trial courts apparently
violates fourteenth amendment due process. It may seem strange
that, in defining "gravely disabled," the clear language of the
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act could be interpreted so expansively.
Looking to legislative history, the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act re
placed the law under which one could be involuntarily confined in
a mental institution if in need of "supervision, treatment, care or
restraint."35 Grave disability was expressly designed to eliminate
the vagaries of that broad language.

Both constitutional interpre

tation and statutory draftsmanship seemed intent on insuring that
those who could function in safety to themselves and others outside
of mental institutions would not be involuntarily incarcerated.
Yet, as is characteristic of involuntary commitment, a combina
tion of prejudice, superstition, confusion and awe of medical diag
nosis continues in practice what appears to have been prohibited by
law.

The Supreme Court used strong language:

A finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify a State's locking
a person up against his wil and keeping him indefinitely in sim31. Id. at 576.
32. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5350 (West 1972).
33. See text accompanying note 13 supra for the statutory definition of
grave disability.
34. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
35. THE DILEMMA OF MENTAL COMMITMENT, supra note 9, at 38, quoting
former CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5550 (West 1966) (repealed 1968).
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pIe custodial confinement. Assuming that that term can be given
a reasonably precise content and that the "mentally ill" can be
identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional
basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous
to no one and can live safely in freedom.
May the State confine the mentally il merely to insure them a
living standard superior to that they enjoy in the private com
munity? That the State has a proper interest in providing care and
assistance to the unfortunate goes without saying. But the mere
presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from prefer
ring his home to the comforts of an institution. Moreover, while
the State may arguably confine a person to save him from harm,
incarceration is !rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the
living standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom,
on their own or with the help of family or friends. .
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save
its citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different? One
might as well ask if the State, to avoid public unease, could incar
cerate all who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric.
Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify
the deprivation of a person's physical liberty.36
.

.

Unfortunately, the Court was confronted with a jury finding that
petitioner was not mentally ill or, if mentally ill, had not received
treatment.

Therefore the Court was not required to decide the

constitutionality of a statutory provision providing for involuntary
incarceration of people in need of treatment.37

This is important,

because the district court had found that "[a] person who is
involuntarily civilly committed to a mental hospital does have a
constitutional right to receive such treatment as will give him a

realistic opportunity to be cured, . . ,"38
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger noted that the Su
preme Court had not adopted the trial court's statement.30 Ac
cording to the Chief Justice, it is not clear that treatment is a
concomitant obligation to incarceration.

The problem, as he sees

it, is principally a question of the extent of the parens patriae
power.40 Chief Justice Burger realized that mental illness is a
fuzzy concept when applied to law. He recognized that there is
considerable debate regarding the definition of mental disease and
what constitutes treatment.

In addition, he noted that there are

many areas of so-called mental illness for which effective therapy
does not exist.

Finally, the Chief Justice acknowledged the uncer

tainty of diagnosis and the paradox that "it is universally recog-

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575- (1975).
Id. at 573.
Id. at 57G n.6 (emphasis added).
Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., concurring),
Id. at -583-84.
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nized as fundamental to effective therapy that the patient acknowl
edge his illness and cooperate with those

attempting to

give

treatment; yet the failure of a large proportion of mentally ill
persons to do so is a common phenomenon."41
According to Chief Justice Burger, the question does not turn on
further

refinement

of

medical

evidence.

Instead,

he

inquires

whether there are persons who are "unable to function in society
and will suffer real harm to themselves unless provided with care in
a sheltered environment."42

If there are such persons, then he

believes the legislature has the power to provide for their involun
tary protection.
Whether one accepts the Chief Justice's approach or that of the
district court makes a great deal of difference, although that differ
ence would not affect the result in Donaldson.

The petitioner's

claim was on the absence of treatment, although petitioner did not
concede that treatment was a sufficient justification for involuntary
hospitalization.

The Chief Justice insisted on a far higher stan

dard for involuntary hospitalization, but would allow hospital con
finement without treatment.
Scientist, refused treatment.

In fact, the petitioner, a Christian
The Court apparently did not adjudi

cate the queston of how the defect in petitioner's case could be
remedied.

If Chief Justice Burger's reasoning were followed, the

remedy would appear to lie in legislative articulation of standards
under which one can be adjudged so helpless as to require protec
tive shelter.

If the district court's path were chosen, the state

would simply have to provide effective treatment.

That, in turn,

would seem principally to require an increase in the budget of state
institutions in order to provide greater contact between patients
and professionals.
If one accepts the latter viewpoint, the so-called patient's rights
to be treated becomes more a duty to treat him.

At the same time,

it becomes a sufficient justification to disregard his or her wishes
not to be treated.

In rejecting this notion, the Chief Justice

mentioned that:

Rather than inquiring whether strict standards of proof or periodic
redetermination of a patient's condition are required in civil con41. Id. at 584.
42. Id.
1093
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finement, the theory accepts the absence of such safeguards but in
sists that the State provide benefits which, in the view of the court,
are adequate "compensation" for confinement. In light of the wide
divergence of medical opinion regarding the diagnosis of and the
proper therapy for mental abnormalities, that prospect is especially
troubling . . . .
43
Although Donaldson applies directly to involuntary commitment
in mental hospitals, it may have broader application as well. As has
previously been noted, while involuntary incarceration exists, so
called "voluntary " hospitalization may in fact be involuntarily im
posed on threat of formal involuntary commitment.44

Assuming

this proposition to be accurate, some of the considerations mentioned
in Donaldson might spill over to "voluntary hospitalization."
In addition, conservatorships raise similar issues even when, as
in California, a sharp line is drawn between conservatorships which
lead to involuntary hospitalization-legal only under Lanterman
Petris-Short
ships.

commitment

standards-and

probate

conservator

Moreover, until July 1977, California will allow imposition

of a guardianship on an old person who is unable to properly care,
"unassisted, " for himself or his property.45 It seems strange that
old age coupled with the inability properly to manage should
suffice as a reason for the appointment of a conservator.
The loss of control of one's property on the appointment of a
conservator is, of course, the most obvious consequence of that
appointment.46

A somewhat less recognized consequence is the

ability of a conservator to determine the place in which the con
servatee will reside.
47

Although California law prohibits forcing

one's ward to live in a mental institution, that prohibition is rare in
other states.

Moreover, even in California, the ability to confine

the conservatee to a place in which he or she may not want to live
seems to impose some of the restraints of liberty discussed in
Donaldson.

It is improbable that a court would enforce the con

servator's requirement that the ward live in a certain place by
punishing the ward's refusal to do so. It seems likely, however,
that the court would allow the conservator to use economic coer
cion in designating the ward's residence.

Because the constitution-

43. rd. at 587.
44. The author has interviewed a number of psychiatrists who have
stated that they routinely use the threat of involuntary process to hold
"voluntary" patients whom they fear to release.
45. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1751 (West Supp. 1977).
46. I have written a book on this issue and will not belabor the point
here. See G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, note 7 supra.
47. CAL. PROB. CODE § 13
1 51 (West Supp. 1977).
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ality of involuntary hospitalization has only recently become of
interest to most courts, it is not surprising to find scant authority on
the issue of whether the Constitution protects one's right to choose
his location of residence.

Hence, it is not clear whether requiring a

person to live in an unlocked ward within a private hospital is as
onerous a requirement as that he or she live behind lock and key.
The distinction may be academic to a patient unable to afford rent
outside of the hospital because a conservator controls his or her
money.
Present California guardianship law appears suspect to the ex
tent that residence provisions can be brought within the Donaldson
holding.

The California statute requires a person to be able to

care for himself or his property "unassisted, " 48 whereas the Don
aldson standard requires that one take into account the help of
family and friends.49 The new law50 will alter the unassisted

management provision by eliminating the word unassisted.51

Of

course, that still leaves open the possibility of adopting the vagaries
of interpretation to the "gravely disabled" clause which continually
plagued the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act.

DOES INVOLUNTARY PLACEMENT HELP?
This article has so far been chiefly concerned with the ethical
and constitutional objections to involuntary treatment of the aged.
In addition, it seems appropriate to briefly review some clinical
evidence of the impact of involuntary placement.

As I have

mentioned earlier, the aged are overrepresented in the population
of involuntary mental patients.

Professor Regan has observed that

"the percentage of mental hospital first admissions of elderly per
sons is increasing more rapidly than the total

population

of

the aged" and that the aged make up thirty percent of men
al hospital patients.52

It is unclear to what extent these sta-

48. Id. § 1460 (West 1956).
49. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
50. The new law becomes effective on July 1,1977. See CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 1460 (West Supp. 1977).
51. Id.
52. Regan, Protective Services for the Elderly: Commitment, Guardian
ship, and Alternatives, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 569, l}74 (19-72) (footnote
omitted).
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tistics simply reflect increased debility in the aged.

Also un

known is the number of patients who have non-psychiatric medical
problems.

Unfortunately, as is true of much of psychiatric diagno

sis, non-psychiatric diagnoses tend to reflect the expectations of
those who bring patients to the diagnostician.
himself."

"Mom is so much more forgetful."

him so much more trouble."

"Dad is just not

"Dad's leg is giving

These and similar statements provide

a strong impression for a physician who may not have previously
seen the patient and who has had experience with patients who
were out of touch with their own functioning.
One of the most common diagnoses is acute or chronic brain
syndrome.

Brain syndrome is considered acute if reversible and

chronic if otherwise.

The disorder is typically thought to be an

organic dysfunction.

Acute brain syndrome may, however, mask

such physical or mental conditions as simple depression, vitamin
deficiency, traumatic injury, or a variety of other ills.

If the

underlying condition is not treated, deterioration may in fact con
firm the original diagnosis of brain syndrome. 53

A brain syn

drome diagnosis, in general, and certainly a chronic brain syn
drome diagnosis, in particular, may be a self-fulfilling prophecy. In
addition, the diagnosis may mask needed treatment in a less dra
matic way.

For example, a colleague recently discussed a situation

in which his mother had suffered a stroke.

She made a miraculous

recovery; all but bladder function returned to normal. The treating
physician was pleased, so pleased in fact that it did not occur to
him to investigate the cause of the remaining problem.

At my

colleague's insistence, the physician eventually diagnosed the con
dition.

He found a massive infection which quickly responded to

treatment.

The patient was cured of all symptoms.

Much of the initial data on which mental health diagnosticians
act in these cases concerns behavior.1H

The symptomatology of

brain syndrome is that a previously healthy individual suddenly
becomes disturbed, confused, restless, or disoriented. Gr;

Because a

significant portion of chronic brain syndrome diagnosis is compar
ative, data must be matched against the patient's prior mental
history.

Most of the behavioral symptoms on which a decision

must be made will already have taken place by the time the

53. See, e.g., Busse, Mental Disorder in Later Life-Organic Brain Syn
drome, in MENTAL ILLNESS IN LATER LIFE 89 (E. Busse & E. Pfeiffer eds.
1973); Goldfarb, Memory & Aging, in THE PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF
HUMAN AGING 149 (R. Goldman & M. Rockstein eds. 1975).
54. Busse, Mental Disorder in Later Life, supra note 53, at 89.
55. Regan, note 52 supra.

1096

HeinOnline -- 14 San Diego L. Rev. 1096 1976-1977

[VOL. 14: 1083, 1977]

Involuntary Placement

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

physician sees the patient.

Therefore, heavy reliance must be

placed on an informer's observation of the person's conduct. The
opportunity for bias on the informer's part is obvious.

Just as an

incompetency proceeding can be used to indicate the petitioner's
interest in the finances of an older person, so too can information
about the older person's behavior be used to cast him or her as
sufficiently debilitated to require involuntary treatment.
I do not suggest that the informant must necessarily be conscious
of his or her role, or that he or she must necessarily be lying. The
entire inquiry is sufficiently unclear that it is possible to paint a
picture of gross disability simply by the selective recollections,
however innocent, of recent events.
the same vague standards.

The diagnosis in turn reflects

Wang reports that 77.7% of first time

geriatric admissions in the year he studied were admitted for brain
syndrome.56

Another study of diagnoses of patients over sixty-five

on first admissions to mental hospitals in Toronto, New York and
London found the respective percentages to be 41.8% in Canada,

79.8% in New York and 42.8% in England.

The study conclud

ed that the difference in percentages was probably not the result of
differences in patients but rather differences in the diagnostic bias
of United States physicians.57
centages of functional

In Canada and England, the per

(non-organic)

disorders were comparably

higher.

Because there is wide textbook difference between non
organic dysfunction and organic brain syndrome, these discrepan
cies indicate some reason for skepticism about chronic brain syn
drome diagnoses.
Apparently the early experience in California under LantermanPetris-Short confirms this belief. One group has noted,

Some mentally disO'l'dered patients were placed involuntarily in
locked facilities under the diagnosis of chronic brain syndrome and
were not provided the opportunity for judicial review of the invol
untary hold. The locked facilities licensed by the state DMH
[California Department of Mental Health] were generally used to
56. Wang, Organic Brain Syndromes, in BEHAVIOR AND ADAPTATION IN
LATE LIFE 263, 265 (E. Busse & E. Pfeiffer eds. 1969).
57. Duckworth & Ross, Diagnostic Differences in Psychogeriatric Patients
in Toronto, New York and London, England,' 112 CAN. MED. A. J. 847
(1975). For a similar study with equally disturbing results, see Copeland,
Kelleher, & Kellett, Diagnostic Differences in Psychogeriatric Patients in
London and New York: United Kingdom-United States Diagnostic Project,

19 CAN. PSYCHIATRIC A. J. 267 (1974).
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provide care for the geriatric, senile patient who would otherwise
wander out into the community, and needed a protective setting
to prevent harm from coming to him because of his condition of
incompetency. The diagnosis of chronic brain syndrome was con
sidered to be an irreversible condition from which the patient
would not "clear" or improve. In actual practice, some patients
so placed in these facilities with a diagnosis of chronic brain syn
drome became "clear", and did improve. A number of professional
persons were concerned that the mentally disordered were being
placed in locked facilities and forgotten rather than being placed
in a protective, but not locked facility such as a board-and-care
home.u8
Throughout this article it has been assumed that the principal
reason for intervention in an old person's life was not because of
danger to himself or others but rather because of his or her
debility. Consequently, it seems appropriate to examine the extent
to which intervention is helpful to that person in living out his or
her life. One study, whiTe concluding that the most traumatic
form of protective service was involuntary placement, attempted to
discern the efficacy of all protective services, not just involuntary
placement.
59
increases

the

The study went on to note, however, that service
likelihood

of

institutionalization:

"[e]xperienced

social workers appear to have a strong tendency to move old people
into 'protective settings' when assigned responsibility for their wel
The
initial study found that, as to all protective
fare."6o
services:

"[o]ne must conclude on the basis of data gathered

from following up ...service and control cases the project service
was not effective in slowing down deterioration and physical func
tioning-two major reasons frequently given for intervening in a
protective case."61

The study's alarming conclusion was that pro

tective services did not lengthen life. On the contrary, these
services appeared to shorten people's lives. The hypothesis was
restudied and reconfirmed. At the conclusion of the second study
the author noted:

Taking the findings as a whole it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that (a) participants in the experimental service program were in
stitutionalized earlier than they would have otherwise been and
(b) that this earlier institutionalization did not-contTary to intent
-prove protective in terms of survival of the older person although
it did relieve collaterals and community agents.1I2
58. ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA's NEW MENTAL
HEALTH LAW 159 (1972).
59. BENJAMIN ROSE INSTITUTE, PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR OLDER PEOPLE:
FINDINGS FROM THE BENJAMIN ROSE INSTITUTE STUDY (1974).
60. Id. at 138.
61. BENJAMIN ROSE INSTITUTE, PROGRESS REPORT ON PROTECTIVE SERVICES
FOR OLDER PEOPLE 68-69 (1967).
62. BENJAMIN ROSE INSTITUTE, supra note 59, at 157.
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CONCLUSION
Whether one views the problem from the standpoint of ethics or
constitutional law, it seems clear that the state must demonstrate
some reason for depriving an elderly person of autonomy. Absent
such a showing, disposing of the elderly by institutionalization
violates the liberty ethic and its constitutional counterpart.

Far

from articulating the rationale, present law is premised largely on
unexamined assumptions.

Chief among these assumptions is the

notion that involuntary process is somehow of benefit to the older
person.

When examined, the benefit appears more frequently to
Even if benefit were generally estab

run to collateral persons.

lished, it is contended that such a benefit would not suffice to offset
the ethical and constitutional deprivation unless the "benefited"
person would be a bad survival risk left to his or her own devices.
In any event, under

present

circumstances,

diagnoses

under

which many older persons are institutionalized are vague and
capable of misapplication.
are misapplied.

It is equally apparent that diagnoses

Moreover, it is of significance that precisely the

same group of collateral persons standing to benefit from their peti
tion for surrogate management of the older person's property are
also in a position to petition for institutionalization and to provide
determinative input for the diagnosis of the need for that institu
tionalization.

There is also a predilection to incarcerate in the

social service group which doubtlessly contributes to the level of
involuntary placement.

Finally, and most tragically, it seems nota

ble that protective services often leading to involuntary incarcera
tion do not prolong life but shorten it.

These services appear not

to satisfy the needs of the elderly but to aid the concerns of their
collaterals and of institutions.
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